The problem of queues and waiting times is part of our daily life and so it is a situation that deserves a thorough study. Queueing theory mathematically studies the waiting lines and is part of the operations research field. This problem involves more complexity since it considers: the arrival process of the agents (customers) according to some probability distribution; the service time distribution and the number of available servers (in line or in parallel); and, finally, the queue discipline that determines the method used to serve the agents: first come, first served; last come, first served; etc.
A queueing problem for a group of agents N is a vector θ = (θ i ) i∈N , where θ i stands for the waiting cost of agent i. A solution, or a rule, for this problem is a pair (σ, t) where for each i, σ i denotes the position in the queue and t i denotes her monetary transfer. It is clear that in order to minimize the aggregated waiting cost, agents should be served according to their waiting cost in non-increasing order (queue efficiency). Thus, we can consider that the queue method applied is determined according to these waiting costs following what the operations research literature on queueing calls a priority queueing discipline, that assigns a priority level (θ i ) to each customer and so they are served following such priority on the first come first served basis.
The axiom of queue efficiency is always imposed on the queue selected by any allocation rule. Thus, what distinguishes each of the proposed rules is the way to determine the transfers, that can be interpreted as compensations for those agents who have to wait to be served. The different interpretations for such compensations give rise to the following rules among others:
• The minimal transfer rule (Maniquet 2003).
• The maximal transfer rule (Chun 2006 ).
• The family of VCG (Vickrey 1961, Clarke 197, and Groves 1973) rules.
The Shapley value is one of the most important solutions in TU games and its fairness considerations fit really well in the situation under study. The minimal and maximal transfer rules can be obtained as Shapley values of some specific cooperative games where the definition of the worth of a coalition has a clear and intuitive meaning. In order to compute the worth of a coalition S, in the case of the minimal transfer rule, it is assumed the agents in the coalition will be served first (optimistic approach). In the case of the maximal transfer rule, it is assumed the members in S will be served in the last place, after all the members in N \ S (pessimist approach). This optimist-pessimistic approach has also been used in the bankruptcy and the minimum cost spanning tree problems. In the former both approaches lead to the same allocation rule, but not in the latter.
Both rules are characterized using the properties of queue efficiency, budget-balance (the sum of the transfers must be zero) and monotonicity properties regarding the population of agents and changes in the waiting costs. It is also worth mentioning that both characterizations are tight as the properties used are independent.
Ju, Chun, and van den Brink (2014) prove these rules can also be obtained as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of two different bargaining procedures where the players have the possibility of negotiating to solve the queueing problem. Thus, both methods have also a non-cooperative support. However, both rules are not appropriate in case the waiting costs are private information, since they do not satisfy strategy-proofness and this is an important drawback of both Shapley values.
When we move to the case where waiting costs are private, rules that give incentives to agents to reveal their true waiting costs should be applied. So, cost-revelation mechanisms are needed to avoid the possibility for the agents to collude and misreport their waiting costs. This information extraction problem was analyzed by Vickrey, Clarke and Groves and lead to the definition of VCG rules which are characterized by means of queue efficiency and strategy-proofness.
Regarding the generalizations of the queueing problem, an interesting issue will be to study what happens when the waiting cost is not linear but a function depending on the position of the agent in the queue. The model could also be enriched by adding a vector of threshold waiting times for the agents, in the sense that an agent would prefer leaving the system rather than waiting more than her threshold. It could be of interest to study this feature along with the possibility for the agents to have an initial budget and therefore the sum of transfers should not exceed this total budget.
The possibility of multiple servers (Mitra 2005 ) is really interesting because it models many real life situations. Concerning this generalization, several considerations can be made. The paper considers a more general waiting cost function for the agents and it is assumed that machines are identical. It could be interesting to consider the machines are different in terms of their speed when serving each agent, despite all the agents need the same processing time. If it is the case, the waiting cost may depend not only on the position in the queue but also on the selected machine.
Concerning the multiple machine case, we can study the case where each of the agents need be served by all the machines in some specific order. Consider such a problem with two machines. In this model, the waiting times will differ from one machine to another. Moreover, the efficient queue in the first machine might not be efficient for the second one.
In conclusion, I congratulate the authors for the great review paper that is very helpful to appreciate the relevance of the topic. Moreover, it shows it has a lot of interesting open questions to be addressed.
